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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

The District Court Erred by Permitting the State to Introduce Evidence of Crimes,
Wrongs, and Bad Acts Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b)
In his Opening Brief, Mr. Cardoza explained how he was harmed by the district court

permitting the State to introduce the confidential informants statement's regarding prior drug
dealings with Mr. Cardoza as well as evidence of a large quantity of methamphetamine being
found inside a vehicle registered to Mr. Cardoza in Oregon. Mr. Cardoza also explained how the
admission of this evidence in the State's case in chief was in error and direct contravention to
Idaho appellate cases addressing this precise issue. Finally, Mr. Cardoza highlighted how the
prosecuting attorney capitalized on this evidence and argued in his closing statement that the jury
should make the inference that Mr. Cardoza must be guilty in this case because of the "magical
coincidences" of the other crimes, wrongs, and bad acts of Mr. Cardoza. Jury Trial Transcript, p.
382, Ins. 3-24.
In response, the State argues that Mr. Cardoza invited the district court's error, that the
highly prejudicial propensity evidence was nonetheless relevant to Mr. Cardoza's intent and
knowledge even though Mr. Cardoza never claimed he was innocent by reason of not knowing
the substance in the borrowed vehicle he was driving was methamphetamine or that he was not
familiar with methamphetamine, that the propensity evidence was not overly prejudicial despite
the fact the prosecuting attorney unabashedly argued propensity to the jury, and finally that any
error committed by the district court was harmless. The State's arguments are unpersuasive and
should be rejected. Moreover, absent from the State's argument is any explanation why cases
such as State v. Naranjo, 152 Idaho 134, 267 P.3d 721 (Ct. App. 200 I), where the Court of

Appeals unequivocally cautioned that evidence of prior drug sales is highly prejudicial, should
not control here.
1.

Mr. Cardoza did not Invite or Induce the District Court into Committing Error and
is not Precluded from Arguing on Appeal Admission of Evidence of Crimes,
Wrongs, and Bad Acts was Incorrect

Citing State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 254 P.3d 77 (Ct. App. 2011) and the doctrine of
invited error, the State argues Mr. Cardoza should be precluded from arguing on appeal that the
confidential informant's testimony about prior drug dealings with Mr. Cardoza is not relevant. 1
On appeal in Norton, the defendant argued that the admission into evidence of an interrogation
transcript was fundamental error. Id. at 187, 254 P.3d at 88. Defense counsel at trial however
had stipulated to the admission of the same transcript. Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that
the defendant cannot complain of error on appeal when the claimed error was stipulated to during
trial. Id.
Here, Mr. Cardoza did not stipulate to the admission of any propensity evidence. Mr.
Cardoza's trial counsel argued this evidence was unfairly prejudicial and precisely the sort of
evidence I.R.E. 404(b) was designed to protect against. Trial Transcript, p. 137, In. 22 - p. 142,
In. 7. Mr. Cardoza does acknowledge trial counsel, albeit wrongly, stated that the State made a
showing that the confidential informant's proffered testimony was relevant to the issue of intent.
Trial Transcript, p. 139, Ins. 1-7. This however, does not preclude Mr. Cardoza from arguing on
appeal that the district court erred in admitting this evidence. Accepting for the sake of argument

1

It is important to note the State did not suggest that the doctrine of invited error
precludes Mr. Cardoza from arguing the court erred in admitting the confidential informant's
testimony pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) or that the evidence of other charged crimes in Oregon was
not relevant, highly prejudicial, and should not have been admitted as evidence in the State's case
in chief.
2

that this evidence can be relevant to the issue of intent, as explained in Mr. Cardoza' s Opening
Brief, Idaho appellate courts have cautioned that evidence of prior drug dealings is highly
prejudicial and in some circumstances has a very low probative value. See e.g., State v. Naranjo,
152 Idaho 134, 267 P.3d 721 (Ct. App. 2011); and State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 178 P.3d 28
(2008). In sum, the invited error doctrine, even if applicable to the narrow issue of the relevancy
regarding the confidential informant's testimony about prior drug dealings, does not prevent this
Court from reviewing the district court's decision to admit evidence under I.RE. 404(b) for an
abuse of discretion.
2.

The State Fails to Recognize and Satisfactorily Address the Highly Prejudicial
Impact of the I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence

In his Opening Brief, Mr. Cardoza quoted the district court's I.R.E. 403 "analysis" and
pointed out how it was woefully absent any explanation or balancing to determine whether the
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. In
response, the State argues that "[e]ven without the district court's findings, in balancing the
prejudicial value of the evidence against its probative value, this Court can conclude that its
probative value is not substantially outweighed by its potential for prejudice." Respondent's
Brief, pp. 23-24. The State then minimizes the effect of the propensity evidence at issue in this
case stating," [a]lthough it might be prejudicial in the sense of being damaging to Cardoza for a
jury to know about the ongoing methamphetamine trafficking arrangement Cardoza had with
Juan and Tapia, such information would not be unfairly prejudicial." Id. at 24.
The evidence of prior drug dealings and the finding of a large amount of
methamphetamine is not something that "might" be prejudicial - it is prejudicial. These
inflammatory facts carry great prejudice in cases of this sort. It is difficult to imagine how a jury
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could not conclude that Mr. Cardoza was more likely to have committed the crime at issue in this
case having heard about prior drug dealings and large quantities of methamphetamine found
elsewhere yet linked to Mr. Cardoza. The protections of I.R.E. 404(b) are at risk of being
completely taken away unless courts strictly scrutinize this sort of evidence and properly balance
the very real and unfair prejudices against the probative value of such evidence. Here the balance
must tip in Mr. Cardoza's favor and the evidence should not have been admissible- at the very
least it should not have been admissible in the State's case in chief.
3.

The Admission of Propensity Evidence was not Harmless Error

The State also argues Mr. Cardoza is not entitled to relief on appeal because any error in
admitting propensity evidence against him was harmless. Response Brief, p. 25. Citing State v.

Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 193 P .3d 878 (Ct. App. 2008), the State suggests that it is highly
unlikely the jury convicted Mr. Cardoza based upon propensity evidence in light of the strength
of the State's case. Id. The State's argument is unpersuasive.
Unlike Gamble, in this case this Court should be unable to "declare, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the [propensity evidence] complained of
contributed to the conviction." Id. at 341, 193 P.3d at 888. Here, as noted in his Opening Brief,
the case against Mr. Cardoza was premised upon Mr. Cardoza's constructive possession of
methamphetamine found in a borrowed vehicle. There were no fingerprints or other forensic
evidence linking Mr. Cardoza to the methamphetamine. Trial Transcript, p. 201, In. 12 - p. 202,
In. 3. Nor did Mr. Cardoza ever admit to possessing the methamphetamine. Trial Transcript, p.
208, Ins. 16-24. Instead, most of the evidence suggesting Mr. Cardoza knowingly possessed the
methamphetamine at issue in this case was premised upon the confidential informant's testimony
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about prior drug dealings with Mr. Cardoza and the evidence that a large quantity of
metharnphetarnine was found in Oregon inside a vehicle registered to Mr. Cardoza.
The State's argument that any error should be considered harmless error is further
undermined by the prosecuting attorney emphasizing in his closing argument that if Mr. Cardoza
was not a drug dealer why did they find metharnphetarnine in his truck in Oregon. There is a
very real possibility this evidence contributed to Mr. Cardoza's conviction.

III. ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL
A.

The District Court Properly Denied the State's Request for Restitution for the
Prosecutor's Attorney Fees
The district court appropriately denied the State's request for restitution for fees

associated with preparing Mr. Cardoza' s case for trial. The issue before this Court involves
interpreting a statute, specifically Idaho Code § 37-2732(k). "Where the language of a statute is
plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in
statutory construction." State v. Garcia-Pineda, 154 Idaho 482, 482, 299 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct.
App. 2013) (citing State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999)). The
language of the statute must be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132
Idaho at 659. However, when ambiguity exists, the Court must engage in statutory construction
and ascertain the legislative intent. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct.
App. 2001). "To ascertain such intent, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined,
but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute and its legislative
history." Garcia-Pineda, 154 Idaho at 482 (citing Beard, 135 Idaho at 646)).
As illustrated below, under the plain language of LC. § 37-2732(k) restitution does not
include the prosecuting attorney's fees in preparing for and going to trial. Even if this Court

5

finds the statute to be ambiguous, the legislative history and public policy further illustrate the
legislature's intent that restitution not include attorney fees.
1.

A Prosecutor's Fees Incurred in Prosecuting a Drug Case are not Recoverable
Restitution Under the Plain Language of LC.§ 37-2732(k)

Idaho Code§ 37-2732(k) allows a court to order restitution in drug cases for the "costs
incurred by law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation." (Emphasis added). Such
costs do not include the prosecuting attorney's fees. Idaho Code§ 37-2732(k) provides in
relevant part:
The court may order restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement agencies in
investigating the violation. Law enforcement agencies shall include, but not be
limited to, the Idaho state police, county and city law enforcement agencies, the
office of the attorney general and county and city prosecuting attorney offices.
Costs shall include, but not be limited to, those incurred for the purchase of
evidence, travel and per diem for law enforcement officers and witnesses
throughout the course of the investigation, hearings and trials, and any other
investigative or prosecution expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries
of employees.
LC. § 37-2732(k). This statute, which enables a court to order that the defendant bear the burden
oflaw enforcement's investigative costs for a drug conviction, is broken down into two parts.
First the definition of "law enforcement agencies" and second the definition of "costs." Law
enforcement agencies are defined as "the Idaho state police, county and city law enforcement
agencies, the office of the attorney general and county and city prosecuting attorney offices." Id.
There appears to be no dispute that the prosecuting attorney office is considered a "law
enforcement agency." The dispute arises in the definition of "costs." Costs are defined as
"[costs] incurred for the purchase of evidence, travel and per diem for law enforcement officers
and witnesses throughout the course of the investigation, hearing and trials, and any other
investigative or prosecution expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries of employees."
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Id (Emphasis added).
The State argues that the definition of "costs" includes the prosecuting attorney's hourly
rate in preparing for and taking Mr. Cardoza' s case to trial. This is not the case as attorney fees
are not included in the restitution statute, but rather are beyond the plain language of the statute.
The State bases this argument in part on this Court's ruling that LC. 37-2732(k) includes the
hourly rate of a law enforcement officers to attend a hearing. State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830,
834-35, 252 P.3d 563, 567-68 (Ct. App. 2010). However, the statute specifically allows for that.

See LC. § 37-2732(k) ("travel and per diem for law enforcement officers and witnesses
throughout the course of the investigation, hearing and trial ... "). The statute arguably even
includes time spent by an investigator employed by the prosecuting attorney office. See LC.§
37-2732(k) ("and any other investigative or prosecution expenses actually incurred, including
regular salaries of employees"). However, "prosecution expenses" do not include the hourly rate
of the handling prosecuting attorney to prosecute the case. The prosecuting attorney's hourly rate
is clearly not included in the plain language of LC. § 37-2732(k), and as such, the Court properly
denied the state's request for the prosecutor's attorney fees.
2.

The Legislature did not Intend for LC. § 37-2732(k) to Include the Costs of
Prosecution

In looking at the public policy and discerning the legislature's intent, LC. § 37-2732(k)
does not include the prosecuting attorney's hourly rate to prepare for and take Mr. Cardoza's case
to trial. If this Court finds LC. § 37-2732(k) to be ambiguous, it must engage in statutory
construction. Beard, 135 Idaho at 646. Statutory construction entails looking at the legislative
history and public policy to discern the legislature's intent. Id. The legislative history does not
include great discussion of the intent for including the disputed provisions of the restitution
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statute, however some guidance is provided.
The relevant language was added in 1986 by Senate Bill 1419 and was taken up in the
same discussion as expanding the forfeiture statute, the latter of which was the focus of the
Statement of Purpose. (Attached at Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Statement of
Purpose and Fiscal Impact for Senate Bill 1419.) That said, the fiscal impact section touches
upon the restitution issue. The fiscal impact states in part:
In a court ordered restitution upon a felony conviction for certain costs of
investigation, the fiscal impact cannot be precisely estimated. However, the
reimbursement of the investigative costs will result in a net positive fiscal impact
since the budget for narcotics enforcement for the Department ofLaw
Enforcement alone is approximately two million ($2,000,000) per annum.

See Exhibit A (emphasis added). This is insightful for two reasons. First, the fiscal impact
statement refers to "certain costs of investigation" not "certain costs of investigation and

prosecution." If the legislature intended for prosecuting attorney offices to recoup the costs of
prosecuting drug offenses, such language would have been specifically added. Second, the fiscal
impact statement mentions "the budget for narcotics enforcement for the Department of Law
Enforcement," again there is no mention of the budget or costs for prosecuting attorney offices.
The legislature's lack of intent to include a prosecutor's attorney fees is also evident by
looking at the language in the statute itself. The legislature is very familiar with attorney fees
and had they wished to include such fees in the restitution statute they could have easily done so.
Or at a minimum, the legislature could have included "prosecuting attorneys" in the portion of
LC. § 37-2732(k) allowing for "travel and per diem for law enforcement officers and witness

throughout the course of the investigation, hearings and trials .... " Id. However, rather than
including "prosecuting attorneys" in that section, the legislature used the conjunction and, thus
separating payments for officers to attend hearings from "any other investigative or prosecution
8

expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries of employees." Id. This further illustrates
that the legislature did not intend restitution to include the costs of a prosecuting attorney to
prepare for and attend hearings. Because the legislature chose not to include a provision for the
costs of prosecution or attorney fees, such fees are not recoverable under I.C. § 37-2732(k). See

also State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856, 861, 153 P.3d 1202, 1207 (Ct. App. 2006) ("In criminal
cases, costs and attorney fees have been denied for lack of statutory authority. [The defendant's]
argument is therefore better presented to the legislature.") (internal citations omitted).
Public policy further supports affirming the district court's denial of the State's request
for attorney fees. A warding the State restitution for the costs of prosecuting a drug charge
creates a disincentive for the prosecutor to resolve cases. As stated in the Defendant's Objection
to State's Request for Restitution for Prosecution Costs, incorporated herein, if going to trial in
drug cases became a "money-maker" for prosecuting attorney offices, then prosecutors would
have a disincentive to resolve cases through plea negotiations. This disincentive violates public
policy which recognizes a prosecutor's responsibility to administer justice. In conclusion, not
only does the plain language of LC. § 37-2732(k) exclude prosecutor's attorney fees from
restitution, but engaging in statutory construction and discerning the legislature's intent further
supports affirming the district court's order.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Cardoza's Opening Brief, this Court should
vacate his judgment of conviction and sentences. Furthermore, the District Court's Order on
Contested Restitution should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this$__ day of September, 2013.
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ownson
Att rney for Martin Cardoza
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STATEMENI' OF PURPOSE
'!he auendrrent provides for court ordered restitution to state, county and
· city law enforcement agencies a.rd prosecutors' offices upon a felony .conviction
~ for

certain costs of investigation.
'!he unamerned statute provides for forfeiture of "m:mey or currency" found

}in "close prox:1m1.ty" to illicit controlled substances when the court finds that
such property was used or interned for use in v+olation of the Contr-olled Sub-

'lhe pr9posal exPa.nas and clarifies what is "currency" by describing
-pther ccmmn mediums of exchar:ge.

It also provides that such items representing

forfeiture when found in close prox1m1ty to illicit drugs.
'lbe requisite firrling by the coort of use or intent for use in connection with
t_raff1ck1ng of controlled substances is el1m1nated.
'lhe proposal provides that marijuana may be destroyed in the field when the
DJ,.rector of the Department . of Law Enforcerrent ·or his dP.signee finds that it is
reasonable to carcy such evidence fran the field.

Marijuana eradication ei'forts

undeveloped areas, such as are found in state arrl national
To require by statute the rerroval of large quantities of
unnecessary and burdensome.
npdated by

r~u1r1ng

Evident1ary concerns are accom-

the keeping of samples, taking photograpns arrl observation
The present statute, which this proposal rurends, requires

that destruction t.e done under the su:r:ervlsion of representatives of the D::partment
Welfare and of the Board of

Pharm:l~~·.

'lhe

~ndrrent

the destruction 1n the field by two-persons> one

provides for

or whom ls the

the Director of the Departrrent of Law Enforcerrent.

EXHIBIT_Jj__
)!'fl?

Federal

drug

enforcerrent

agencies

have ·notified

state

agencies that

(

properties forfeited under federal forfeiture procedures may be given to state

drug enforcement agencies for their use 1n enforcing state arxi federal controlled
substances acts where there is author! ty .for receipt thereof' in state law.

'lhe

amerrlment provides a vehicle for receipt arrl use of sucll property arrl for deposit
o.f proceeds in the narcotics en.forcerrent account.

FISCAL IMPAar
In a court ordered restitution upon a felony conviction for certain costs

...

of investigation, t11e fiscal impact cannot ·be precisely estimated.

However, the

reimbursement of investigative costs will result in a net positive fiscal impact
since the budget for narcotics enforcerrent for the Department or law Enforcement
alone is approximately two million dollars ($2,000 1 000) per annum.
With regard to forfeiture of m:mey or currency found in "close proximity",
the Departrrent of law Enforcenent foresees an increaae in the volurre of property
forfeited by state arrl federal agencies for violations of the controlled substances
act.

'lhe exact value of such property is impossible to predict.

However, the

proposal, insofar a.s it addresses forfeitures, Will definitely have a net positive
fiscal impact.
The destruction of marijuana in the field will eliminate co.sts of transporting
and storing large quantities of drugs and equiprrent.. 'Ihis will result in a net

positive

fisc~l

imp::lct.

Proposed authorizatfon for state agencies to receive do;iations of property
from federal agencies and fran private citizens will have a net positive fiscal
imract.

(

